One item to nitpick is the “take the hill” analogy and its conclusion:
“Plans are wrong. This is why combat units plan quickly, and move out, knowing the plan will be wrong. Acquisitions bureaucrats try to get the plan right. But they never will, especially when inventing new tech.”
While not the point of your article, this isn’t accurate and detracts from the brilliance of the rest of the piece. Yes, plans can change in tactical scenarios, but the vast majority of the time they generally remain similar enough. Sometimes plans are done in 5 minutes in sand, sometimes they are done over months or years with singular focus. The most important ones are the latter. Knowing the difference of when each is appropriate is key. Also, important to note that units are able to function effectively in dynamic battlefield conditions first because of preplanned contingencies and second because of ingrained TTPs and SOPs that were part of deeper institutional planning. Planning and training are arguably the most vital elements of any combat unit’s success. I think the point you’re actually making is about the ability to plan quickly, remain flexible, and be adaptable, which I wholeheartedly agree with and believe can be more effectively adapted to acquisitions.
The problem is these programs have become Trust Funds. Generational livelihood, multi generational.
The purpose of a system is what it does.
The results of any policy over time are the true policy.
As far as unmatched capabilities there hasn’t been a match since 1945, the actual sub-prime matches results weren’t encouraging.
Finally with some modest experience men like to know what they’re really involved in if they are committed and war is commitment, they must be told, and they cannot be ordered but must be asked. That didn’t happen, what did happen was keenly discerned.
15% is the schedule overrun threshold in Earned Value where a variance is deemed unrecoverable. The program is essentially guaranteed to overrun. That’s low hanging fruit for the budget cutters.
Excellent analysis. Just from the China side, Chinese military analysts closely monitor U.S. programs like the MQ-4C Triton and LUSVs, viewing them as significant advancements in maritime surveillance and unmanned operations. But they view reductions in such programs as signals of a strategic shift, allowing the U.S. to reallocate resources toward capabilities more directly relevant to the Pacific theater. Basically, we think the defense acquisition system is broken, but the Chinese still think we’re 100ft tall. Let’s hope they don’t catch on…
One item to nitpick is the “take the hill” analogy and its conclusion:
“Plans are wrong. This is why combat units plan quickly, and move out, knowing the plan will be wrong. Acquisitions bureaucrats try to get the plan right. But they never will, especially when inventing new tech.”
While not the point of your article, this isn’t accurate and detracts from the brilliance of the rest of the piece. Yes, plans can change in tactical scenarios, but the vast majority of the time they generally remain similar enough. Sometimes plans are done in 5 minutes in sand, sometimes they are done over months or years with singular focus. The most important ones are the latter. Knowing the difference of when each is appropriate is key. Also, important to note that units are able to function effectively in dynamic battlefield conditions first because of preplanned contingencies and second because of ingrained TTPs and SOPs that were part of deeper institutional planning. Planning and training are arguably the most vital elements of any combat unit’s success. I think the point you’re actually making is about the ability to plan quickly, remain flexible, and be adaptable, which I wholeheartedly agree with and believe can be more effectively adapted to acquisitions.
Spot on, exactly what I was trying to articulate!
Excellent article.
The problem is these programs have become Trust Funds. Generational livelihood, multi generational.
The purpose of a system is what it does.
The results of any policy over time are the true policy.
As far as unmatched capabilities there hasn’t been a match since 1945, the actual sub-prime matches results weren’t encouraging.
Finally with some modest experience men like to know what they’re really involved in if they are committed and war is commitment, they must be told, and they cannot be ordered but must be asked. That didn’t happen, what did happen was keenly discerned.
We need a Big Beautiful BRAC - just one installation goes, but if it doesn’t it takes us all down: Arlington 20301.
It’s gotta go.
15% is the schedule overrun threshold in Earned Value where a variance is deemed unrecoverable. The program is essentially guaranteed to overrun. That’s low hanging fruit for the budget cutters.
Thanks! One question, do you have a source for “Boeing laid off entire team” under the XLUUV entry?
I do. Not one I'd attribute. Go look through the LinkedIn profiles of the Boeing XLUUV team. They're starting to change as they get new jobs
Excellent analysis. Just from the China side, Chinese military analysts closely monitor U.S. programs like the MQ-4C Triton and LUSVs, viewing them as significant advancements in maritime surveillance and unmanned operations. But they view reductions in such programs as signals of a strategic shift, allowing the U.S. to reallocate resources toward capabilities more directly relevant to the Pacific theater. Basically, we think the defense acquisition system is broken, but the Chinese still think we’re 100ft tall. Let’s hope they don’t catch on…
I write about PLA C4ISR capability development, if interested. https://ordersandobservations.substack.com