The first three are pretty good discussion points; the fourth seems like wishful thinking. The PLARF isn’t the only antiship missile threat the PLA can deploy against CSGs - they have bombers, submarines, and surface vessels with long range capabilities as well. The PLARF is part of a multi-domain, multi-axis kill web supported by national-level PRC ISRT; even if one part of the web underperforms there are redundancies (though not out to 1800+ NMs).
5. There will be no mines and we will have unfettered access to the littoral.
Also, number 1 is news to me and a shock. Of all the services, Navies should be the cultural home of Centralized Control, Decentralized Execution; with OPCON remaining with the Battlestaff at sea.
Oh, there absolutely will be. My British sarcasm doesn't always translate online! Pretty much all my Royal Navy exercises started with the phrase, 'Lets assume there's no mines/the mine-clearing is done', etc. We don't think about it enough and it'll be a mess.
1. "Fight from the MOC" is not anti-delegation, but a survival adaptation to network warfare and ballistic missiles. TS satellite data and all sorts of other sensors must work together in realtime to build the targeting solutions to literally hundreds of supersonic objects at the same time. Shooters have small windows of success and probably will need advanced notice.
No one is taking away a COs right to pull the trigger in self defense or exploit an opportunity. (At least not in theory). It's a good ol' sectors of fire and team communication solutions that any squad of soldiers would have to internalize. It's just that the sectors of fire are cones going up into low earth orbit and the targets are going from China to Guam in less than the time it takes to write this paragraph.
You can read the open source material about recent defense of Israel from Iranian barrages
5. Mines should be top of list for Taiwan defense. I think our entire national arsenal of them should be stockpiled in Guam or sold to Taiwan. They might not work, but historically admirals don't hazard the risk.
4. Probably need a fact check on the water vs fuel thing. I'm pretty sure it's a linguistics thing based on the Chinese phrase about putting water in with a ham. (Aka, inflation of numbers, not actually water in rockets).
That said, the missiles just need to be enough of a threat to convince the admirals not to hazard the risk. Historically, admirals don't submit capital ships to the line of contact. Battleships in WW2 being a good example.
3. Don't you think that our CIA advisors to the Ukraine's drone program are pulling lessons into our CONOPs? It's the most successful employment of USVs ever and one of the most successful sea denial programs in history. We just need the hardware and programmable software.
I dont believe that the Chinese are as monolithically hiveminded and capable as they are attempting so stridently to seem. Recall their incursion into Vietnam and the hubristic swaggering and baseless confidence that the PLA initiated hostilities. The regional powers of concern, and somewhat skeptically, the actual world powers and superpowers were certain of a swift and certain chinese victory, if not, then a protracted attrition focused conflict, with china in the advantageous position to dictate terms to the Vietnamese. That was NOT what transpired, Vietnam bled the PLA and sent the swaggering, cocky, and untested since the 1950's back over the border in boxes. In absence of order and demoralized. It did not take long. Now I am seeing similar efforts to bolster their own confidence with demostration of bullying behavior on the high seas, overtly hostile overtures, and the open statements of hostile intent, and allegiance to the most misanthropic and poorly managed bloc of nations to coalesce into such an entity in quite some time. In this crowd of bad actors, i do believe that they have proven to be the most competent, focused, determined, and successful of that bloc, but I also think that the U.S., South Korea, Japan, Europe, India, and Taiwan are in a very good position for tolerating the behavior of the PLAN and the fact that the Chinese seem to believe that the lack of overt hostile action in response to their irresponsible actions is a sign of fear, weakness, a lack of resolve or a laxk of actual capability. Since this generation of Chinese pateiots has yet to really be tested, and the extent of ACTUAL currency in practical applications of ACTUAL combat are not significant enough to be considered noteworthy, (the Spratly Islands and associated actions not withstanding), China must be rudely awakened at some point and this high-seas bullying brought to a swift and definite end. For the U.S. and our flobal networknof allies it could be done hardware wise. We are just not that type of people. To our own peril. I am certain that America and our allies have the capability, experience, comprehansive global projection capability (demonstrated several times a year), highly traines and motivated personel that have a strong sense of GLOBAL responsibility to enforce GLOBAL agreements and keep the WORLDS SUPPLY CHAIN free and unfettered except for by mother nature. And even after that we will still be available to help our least favorite, most hostile, and even the overtly aggresive; recover and get back on their feet. We have no shortage of Marines, Soldiers, Sailors, and Airman whonare ready right now. I know for a fact that Americas warfightersnare both chomping at the bit and hoping beyond hopenthat the wil please come to their senses - with every new report of Chinese belligerence and sabre rattling. Because we have beem in constant contact with hostile forces for well over 20 years, and we know the pricw of victory. Patriotic speeches dont work as well on combat vets, but you aren't less patriotic you just know whats coming after the fanfare and flag-waving. As a U.S.Marine Infant ryman Ilove our dress blues, but our work clothes are not made for parades. They are made to be covered in mud and blood and my brothers and sisters in each of our services knownall too well what we stand to lose when the future reveals the time and date that we have GLOBALLY had enougb. Or rathe who we stand to lose, because it will be us and peoplenwhos names we know that dont return from fulfilling our orders, or return broken. But i have not EVER met a soldier, sailor, airman, or Marine that would hesitate to do whatever it takes to make the wnemy not want to fight anymore. With a near peer adversary like China, there will be no doubt as to where they are and whatever they are doing there will come to a halt as the U.S. and our allies grow tired of the refusal of this country of such awesome potenti and such dystopian governance challenges the FUNCTIONING WORLD ORDER. Every one will suffer be we will prevail. Semper Fi'
The first three are pretty good discussion points; the fourth seems like wishful thinking. The PLARF isn’t the only antiship missile threat the PLA can deploy against CSGs - they have bombers, submarines, and surface vessels with long range capabilities as well. The PLARF is part of a multi-domain, multi-axis kill web supported by national-level PRC ISRT; even if one part of the web underperforms there are redundancies (though not out to 1800+ NMs).
5. There will be no mines and we will have unfettered access to the littoral.
Also, number 1 is news to me and a shock. Of all the services, Navies should be the cultural home of Centralized Control, Decentralized Execution; with OPCON remaining with the Battlestaff at sea.
This is super interesting on mining - I think Ukraine Black Sea suggests there would be mining though? (Haven’t looked closely)
Oh, there absolutely will be. My British sarcasm doesn't always translate online! Pretty much all my Royal Navy exercises started with the phrase, 'Lets assume there's no mines/the mine-clearing is done', etc. We don't think about it enough and it'll be a mess.
1. "Fight from the MOC" is not anti-delegation, but a survival adaptation to network warfare and ballistic missiles. TS satellite data and all sorts of other sensors must work together in realtime to build the targeting solutions to literally hundreds of supersonic objects at the same time. Shooters have small windows of success and probably will need advanced notice.
No one is taking away a COs right to pull the trigger in self defense or exploit an opportunity. (At least not in theory). It's a good ol' sectors of fire and team communication solutions that any squad of soldiers would have to internalize. It's just that the sectors of fire are cones going up into low earth orbit and the targets are going from China to Guam in less than the time it takes to write this paragraph.
You can read the open source material about recent defense of Israel from Iranian barrages
2.
Thanks for writing this excellent piece among others. It's boldly thoughtful and realistically critical. Respect.
5. Mines should be top of list for Taiwan defense. I think our entire national arsenal of them should be stockpiled in Guam or sold to Taiwan. They might not work, but historically admirals don't hazard the risk.
4. Probably need a fact check on the water vs fuel thing. I'm pretty sure it's a linguistics thing based on the Chinese phrase about putting water in with a ham. (Aka, inflation of numbers, not actually water in rockets).
That said, the missiles just need to be enough of a threat to convince the admirals not to hazard the risk. Historically, admirals don't submit capital ships to the line of contact. Battleships in WW2 being a good example.
3. Don't you think that our CIA advisors to the Ukraine's drone program are pulling lessons into our CONOPs? It's the most successful employment of USVs ever and one of the most successful sea denial programs in history. We just need the hardware and programmable software.
2. Right on. Affordable hard kill a la CIWS and Carrier aviation is going to be essential to survival.
I dont believe that the Chinese are as monolithically hiveminded and capable as they are attempting so stridently to seem. Recall their incursion into Vietnam and the hubristic swaggering and baseless confidence that the PLA initiated hostilities. The regional powers of concern, and somewhat skeptically, the actual world powers and superpowers were certain of a swift and certain chinese victory, if not, then a protracted attrition focused conflict, with china in the advantageous position to dictate terms to the Vietnamese. That was NOT what transpired, Vietnam bled the PLA and sent the swaggering, cocky, and untested since the 1950's back over the border in boxes. In absence of order and demoralized. It did not take long. Now I am seeing similar efforts to bolster their own confidence with demostration of bullying behavior on the high seas, overtly hostile overtures, and the open statements of hostile intent, and allegiance to the most misanthropic and poorly managed bloc of nations to coalesce into such an entity in quite some time. In this crowd of bad actors, i do believe that they have proven to be the most competent, focused, determined, and successful of that bloc, but I also think that the U.S., South Korea, Japan, Europe, India, and Taiwan are in a very good position for tolerating the behavior of the PLAN and the fact that the Chinese seem to believe that the lack of overt hostile action in response to their irresponsible actions is a sign of fear, weakness, a lack of resolve or a laxk of actual capability. Since this generation of Chinese pateiots has yet to really be tested, and the extent of ACTUAL currency in practical applications of ACTUAL combat are not significant enough to be considered noteworthy, (the Spratly Islands and associated actions not withstanding), China must be rudely awakened at some point and this high-seas bullying brought to a swift and definite end. For the U.S. and our flobal networknof allies it could be done hardware wise. We are just not that type of people. To our own peril. I am certain that America and our allies have the capability, experience, comprehansive global projection capability (demonstrated several times a year), highly traines and motivated personel that have a strong sense of GLOBAL responsibility to enforce GLOBAL agreements and keep the WORLDS SUPPLY CHAIN free and unfettered except for by mother nature. And even after that we will still be available to help our least favorite, most hostile, and even the overtly aggresive; recover and get back on their feet. We have no shortage of Marines, Soldiers, Sailors, and Airman whonare ready right now. I know for a fact that Americas warfightersnare both chomping at the bit and hoping beyond hopenthat the wil please come to their senses - with every new report of Chinese belligerence and sabre rattling. Because we have beem in constant contact with hostile forces for well over 20 years, and we know the pricw of victory. Patriotic speeches dont work as well on combat vets, but you aren't less patriotic you just know whats coming after the fanfare and flag-waving. As a U.S.Marine Infant ryman Ilove our dress blues, but our work clothes are not made for parades. They are made to be covered in mud and blood and my brothers and sisters in each of our services knownall too well what we stand to lose when the future reveals the time and date that we have GLOBALLY had enougb. Or rathe who we stand to lose, because it will be us and peoplenwhos names we know that dont return from fulfilling our orders, or return broken. But i have not EVER met a soldier, sailor, airman, or Marine that would hesitate to do whatever it takes to make the wnemy not want to fight anymore. With a near peer adversary like China, there will be no doubt as to where they are and whatever they are doing there will come to a halt as the U.S. and our allies grow tired of the refusal of this country of such awesome potenti and such dystopian governance challenges the FUNCTIONING WORLD ORDER. Every one will suffer be we will prevail. Semper Fi'
Author- I am not sure physical risks don’t exist at any _OC ops center, but hardly the issue they are on the line
Ceding authority to subordinates is a major career risk.
Physical risks are moot at any MOC or TOC.
So it depends on what Risk means.
“Challenge: Centralizing decision-making at fleet headquarters is very risky.”
No challenge at all. The most at risk will be dead or disgraced.
Has Abu Gharib and a generation of risk management down, bottom cover as the lawyers say taught us nothing?
How are physical risks moot at a MOC? I agree on the cultural career risk